The firm that rewarded the first partners out of the door
Weil, Gotshal & Manges keeps some forty-five partners and around two hundred lawyers on Fetter Lane, next door to the Rolls Building, where the High Court hears the City’s insolvencies, and it was there, late on the evening of 28 October, that associates were told they would receive ninety days’ pay and that the London office was expected to wind up on 31 December. In New York, a few hours earlier, the management committee had recommended that the partnership dissolve itself after ninety-five years, and somewhere inside that recommendation sat roughly ten floors of the General Motors Building on Fifth Avenue, leased at fifty-four million dollars a year until 2034, which had quietly become the question every partner still on the letterhead had been asking himself for months: who pays the rent on the years that are left.
This was not a firm in difficulty in any sense an analyst would recognise, since it billed more than two billion dollars, paid its equity partners upwards of five million each, carried no financial debt and traded well for most of 2026. Over the same year, however, around forty partners walked out, among them the head of corporate, Michael Aiello, who took five colleagues with him to Cravath in September, until in late October two pillars gave way within days of each other: the merger talks with Willkie Farr and the succession to the long-serving chairman Barry Wolf, after Ramona Nee, the partner designated to replace him, stepped back from the role and, according to the FT, into talks with Kirkland & Ellis.
The reading that has settled over Manhattan is the familiar one about the war for talent, in which faster-growing rivals offer guaranteed pay to the partners who bring in the large mandates while Weil failed to hold on to them. It is accurate as far as it goes, but it explains why the first ten left and not why another thirty followed them, still less why a firm with those numbers chose to close rather than to shrink.
For that one has to read the partnership agreement rather than the accounts, because in an American firm of that size each equity partner builds up over the years a capital account that represents his stake and that the firm buys back, when he leaves, on a fixed schedule. There is nothing unusual in this, indeed it is precisely the clause that allows a partnership to be left without a scene; the trouble begins when the firm itself closes, because at that point partners’ capital is repaid last, behind trade creditors and behind landlords, which means behind the General Motors Building and the other offices Weil leases across America, Europe and Asia. The partner who left in March has therefore been paid out in instalments while the firm was alive, whereas the one who stays to the end holds a stake that ranks after Manhattan, and although that lease will not bite for every remaining year, since the cap American bankruptcy law places on a landlord’s claim, which does not bind an out-of-court wind-down but hangs over every negotiation, brings it down to little more than a year’s rent, that still means something like sixty million dollars for the headquarters alone before the rest of the estate is counted. Leaving, meanwhile, costs almost nothing, because New York lawyers cannot be bound by non-compete clauses and since 2014, when the state’s Court of Appeals decided the Thelen case, the hourly matters a partner takes with him no longer belong to the firm he walks out of, so that not even a dissolved partnership can claim the fees he goes on to earn elsewhere.
The nearest precedent is Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, wound down in 2023, whose creditors recovered a little over half of their agreed claims, so that if those standing at the front of the queue receive fifty-five cents on the dollar, those standing behind them already know roughly what to expect; and this is the point at which departure stops being a career decision and becomes a sum.
A partner may believe in the firm without having a better offer on the table, yet the moment he watches the third member of the management committee leave, the calculation he makes no longer concerns the future of Weil but his own place in the queue, since every exit removes revenue that must still cover the same fixed costs while lengthening the line of creditors standing between him and his capital. Within an architecture of this kind staying is not loyalty but exposure, and the prudent partner was therefore not the faithful one but rather the one who had read the agreement before anyone else; stripped of the partnership rhetoric, the structure rewarded by contract those who defected early and charged the cost of closure to those who stayed last.
It is often said that firms of this sort pass from solid to finished with nothing in between, yet Weil shows that this is not quite so, because the intermediate stages were there and lasted almost two years, from the moment in late 2024 when members of the management committee began to leave, only they were invisible to the instruments by which the firm measured itself. Revenue and profit per partner arrive late, recording work already billed by partners who may already have signed elsewhere, whereas what announces the fall in advance is behaviour, namely the partner who resigns from the management committee or defers his commitment on the succession, the one who stops bringing in new instructions or asks, casually, how his capital would be repaid; these are perfectly legible signals, except that as a rule nobody has been asked to read them.
That is why the decisive signal was not Aiello’s departure but Ramona Nee’s withdrawal, since a partner who leaves with his own book says something about his own interest, while a designated successor who declines to lead the firm says something about the firm itself, being the person who had seen the numbers at closest range and had decided not to bet on them. From that moment the other partners no longer needed to guess what the best-informed among them thought, because it was in front of them; as for the Willkie merger, which might have diluted the problem inside a larger structure, it collapsed in the same days and less than a week passed between the failed talks and the recommendation to close.
The wind-down procedure itself, moreover, reveals the design of the whole, because the fees clients still owe have to be collected quickly and the task falls to the partners, many of whom are negotiating their way into rival firms that would very much like to advise those same clients, so that each of them must choose between filling the old till and not souring the new relationship.
The same mechanics operate, at a fraction of the scale, in any four-partner wealth structuring LLP in Edinburgh or Leeds whose members’ agreement was drafted twenty years ago, when nobody imagined leaving, with capital repaid at book value over eighteen months to whoever goes and a long lease on a floor in town, personally guaranteed, for whoever stays. The first member leaves for entirely private reasons, the second after doing the sums on the first, while the two who remain discover that they are guaranteeing rent sized for four on the fees of two; and yet none of them has mismanaged anything, because the error lay in the document they signed together, written with every thought for how one joins and none for how one leaves. The difference from Manhattan is that in Britain this asymmetry is imposed by no one, since English courts will enforce a reasonable restrictive covenant between partners and the insolvency regime allows withdrawals taken by LLP members in the two years before a winding-up to be clawed back where they knew, or ought to have known, what was coming, so that what in New York is a feature of the legal order remains here a drafting choice, and one that can be redrafted.
For anyone sitting inside a structure whose capital walks on its partners’ legs, the useful question is therefore not when the first departure will come, since it always does, but what the second will make rational for the third. It can only be answered by rereading the agreement through the eyes of someone who wants to leave rather than those of the people who signed it, weighing the timing of capital repayments against the length of the fixed commitments and the rank of partners’ capital against that of the creditors, because whoever has never done so owns a structure that looks sound for as long as the accounts confirm it, and in New York the accounts confirmed it until a few months from the end.