The family office CEO and the branch that decides his renewal
The contract was due to expire in December and everyone in the family office assumed the renewal would be a formality. What very few of them knew was that the formality had already been dispatched at the end of October, over dinner at a discreet restaurant off Mount Street, where the only people at the table were the chief executive and the cousin who speaks for the strongest branch of the family. When the board met in November to approve the renewal, the discussion lasted twelve minutes and none of the directors representing the other branches asked why the terms had been settled down to the last detail, the new bonus cap included.
The family made its money in the Midlands, in precision engineering, over three generations, and is now divided into four branches descending from the founder’s children. In 2019 it sold the business to a private equity buyer and moved most of the proceeds into a single family office in Mayfair, guided by a principle that everyone accepted at the time: the capital should be run by a professional rather than a relative, precisely so that decades of accumulated tension inside a family company would not migrate intact into the portfolio. The chief executive they hired came from the UHNW desk of a private bank, capable and well used to complicated families, on a package that looks impeccable on paper, with a solid base salary, a bonus tied to performance against an agreed benchmark and a further element linked to growth in assets under management.
This is the model towards which the sector is converging with some haste, and in Britain the haste has an obvious accelerant, since the curtailment of business property relief has led more than one owner family to reconsider the timing of a sale or a restructuring, and every sale turns operating wealth into liquid wealth that suddenly needs an institution around it. The most recent surveys of family offices describe a professionalisation that now reaches well beyond investment into the organisation as a whole, while roughly a third of the families questioned expect a change of leadership within five years and concede that they have neither clear plans nor ready heirs. The instinctive response to that double pressure is to hire outside professionals, pay them well and measure them on what can be measured; and this is where the mechanism begins to drift, because what can be measured is not the work the professional was actually brought in to do.
The real work of a chief executive in a family office with several branches is something else entirely: deciding how much cash to distribute and how much to reinvest when one branch has children at university and another has a cousin in private equity who would like forty per cent committed to closed-end funds; choosing who sits on the investment committee; explaining to one branch why its property project will not be financed; handling a request from a branch that wants out without the others reading it as betrayal. This is mediation in its purest form, with a political component that no benchmark records. None of these tasks appears in the contract and none of them is remunerated, yet it is precisely on these tasks that the chief executive is judged when the time comes to renew him.
The structural point is that he has not one employer but four, with different and occasionally opposing interests, and a contract that pretends he has only one. Any agent with several principals learns quickly which of them really counts, namely the one on whom his tenure depends, and it is entirely rational for him to tilt his discretionary decisions in that direction. None of this is disloyalty, still less corruption: the benchmark is beaten, the bonus is honestly earned and the quarterly reports reach every branch with the same punctuality. What shifts is the fine grain of decisions, the part that no minority branch can contest because each decision, taken on its own, is perfectly defensible. So the allocation to closed-end funds creeps up by a few points each year, because the cousin from the strong branch champions it and because it is in any case an arguable choice for a family that likes to think it invests across generations; meanwhile the distribution policy stays cautious, since the strong branch has no need of cash and the branches that do lack the votes to change it, while the reporting grows more detailed on the lines that interest whoever decides the renewal and more summary on those that would interest everyone else, a change nobody notices because there was never a moment at which it happened.
Put more clinically, the family office has not neutralised the conflict between branches it was created to neutralise. It has outsourced that conflict to a salaried individual whose professional survival depends on one of the parties to it. The family believed it was buying independence and bought instead, at the market rate, an ally for the branch that already held the most power.
The arrangement holds for as long as nothing happens, and for years nothing may happen at all. The problem surfaces with the first event that forces the family to reopen the balance of power, whether the death of the founder’s last surviving daughter who kept the cousins together or a divorce that brings a spouse with lawyers of their own into one of the branches, sometimes nothing more dramatic than a request to cash out a stake from a grandson in New York who knows the family office only through its reports. At that point the family turns to the chief executive as the neutral professional it always assumed it had and discovers that he cannot be one; worse, it discovers that the minority branches have long regarded him as a party to the dispute and read his proposals for compromise as what, structurally, they are, namely the strong branch’s position presented in the language of technical expertise.
There is also a reason why the chief executive himself has no interest in raising the problem. The market for senior roles in single family offices is small and closely watched, in London no less than in Geneva or Lugano, and losing a mandate of this kind at fifty, after leaving a bank to take it, is a visible career risk; anyone who comes from private banking has spent twenty years learning to identify who signs and to cultivate that relationship before any other. Asking the family to rewrite his contract so as to make it independent of the strong branch would mean jeopardising the very relationship that secures his renewal, which is not something a rational professional does on his own initiative.
Nor will the family do it unprompted, for a subtler reason. Correcting the incentives would require defining measurable governance objectives, establishing who decides the renewal and on what criteria beyond returns, and defining them would require exactly the consensus between branches whose absence led the family to hire an outsider in the first place. The circle closes on itself: the professional was brought in because the family could not agree, while his contract cannot be corrected because the family cannot agree.
There is, finally, a second-order effect that families almost always underestimate. The minority branches, realising slowly that the professional is not neutral, stop bringing him their real concerns and begin building parallel channels, an external manager for their personal share and a trusted solicitor, occasionally even a banker the chief executive once worked with who, without anyone asking, reports back. The family office founded to centralise the management of the family’s wealth becomes the place where only the portion already decided by the strong branch is managed, while the rest of the family organises itself elsewhere and in silence.
Families that have built a family office around an outside chief executive without separating the people who decide his renewal from the people who benefit from his discretionary choices will find, at the next generational discontinuity, that they employ a capable professional who cannot do the job he was hired for, alongside minority branches that have already stopped trusting him. The question worth asking is not “does our chief executive beat the benchmark?” but “on the day we need him, will all of us be able to listen to him?”; and in most cases the answer is already written into the renewal clause.